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ILLINOIS CIVIL EVIDENCE-1972
Robert Emmett Burns*
The proposed Rules of Evidence for federal courts have renewed interest
in substantive reformation of common law evidence in a number of states,
including Illinois. Professor Burns discusses a recent Illinois case which
illustrates how influential the proposed rules are likely to be in the process
of self-reform by the courts.
HE path of change, direction or reform in Illinois common
law evidence seems to be in the direction of considered incorpor-
ation of selected code provisions from other jurisdictions,1 es-
pecially the proposed Rules of Evidence for Federal District Courts.2
In Naylor v. Gronkowski3 for instance, a First District Appellate Court
in a Dram Shop Act suit, found occasion to suggest that the unavai-
ability requirement for admitting declarations against interest4
should be considered satisfied if a witness is unable to give his
former firsthand knowledge of the facts.
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1 et seq. (West Supp. 1973); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 600.2101 et seq. (Supp. 1973); N.J. REV. STAT. §H 2A:84A-1 et seq.
(Supp. 1972). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF
EVIDENCE (1953).
2. See proposed FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE rules 101-1101, 51 F.R.D. 315
(1971). Illinois, relying on Rule 609, changed its crime impeachment law in
People v. Montgomery, 47 Il. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
3. 9 Ill. App. 3d 302, 292 N.E.2d 227 (1972).
4. See generally 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE 99 1455-77 (Chadbourn rev. 1972);
Jefferson, Declaration Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1944); Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REV.
451 (1952).
Morgan sets out all the rules which different courts have applied in varying
combinations to govern the admission of declarations against interest:
(a) the declarant had peculiar knowledge of the fact,
(b) the fact was to the declarant's immediate prejudice, that is, against
his interest at the time of the declaration,
(c) the declarant at the time of the declaration knew the fact to be
against his interest,
(d) the declarant had no motive to falsify,
(e) the declaration was made ante litem motam,
(f) the interest was pecuniary or proprietary, and
(g) the declarant is dead.
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In Naylor, plaintiff's husband was killed in a bar brawl when
struck with a pool cue. In the course of trial, plaintiff called witness
Spagnola who had been convicted of the murder of plaintiff's dece-
dent. At his own trial, growing out of the affray, Spagnola had
given evidence that he had gone to the defendant's establishment
numerous times on the day of the murder, had purchased intoxicat-
ing beverages there and was "drunk." At the dram shop trial, civil
witness Spagnola stated that he was unable to remember anything
of what happened on the evening in question, despite all attempts
to refresh his memory. Plaintiff then offered Spagnola's prior testi-
mony and the court received it as a declaration against penal interest.
The defendant appealed, contending that the prior testimony was
hearsay, with no exception to the hearsay rule applicable.5
Is non-recollection of his prior declaration by a witness sufficient
"unavailability" to qualify for declaration against interest treatment
in Illinois? The First Appellate District Court has answered yes.'
That Naylor constitutes a departure from precedent is demon-
strated by the noticeable absence of Illinois citations within the
court's decision. Rather, the court looked to federal cases, learned
articles or hornbooks to support its reasoning. Illinois law tradition-
ally has held that in order for a declaration to fit into the "against
interest" exception, it must be against pecuniary or proprietary inter-
est and the declarant must be dead at the time of the trial.7  The
5. It is to be noted that the prior recorded testimony exceptions would be
inapplicable for the parties and proceedings would be different.
6. If Spagnola actually did not remember the events of February 19,
1965, leading to the death of Naylor, then his testimony as to that
matter is unavailable. His total loss of memory concerning such facts as
his leaving the home of Wisniewski, what he had to drink, or if he had
purchased any alcohol, makes his testimony unavailable even though he
was a witness in court at the time of trial. If he does remember the
facts and is simply refusing to testify, his testimony is likewise unavailable.
Spagnola was in jail for the murder of Naylor, and the court could not
use its contempt power as leverage to force him to testify. Under the
facts of the case, this testimony was therefore unavailable, and such un-
availability satisfies the requirement with respect to the introduction in evi-
dence of a declaration against interest.
9 Ill. App. 3d at 307, 292 N.E.2d at 230.
7. Bird v. Bird, 218 Il. 158, 75 N.E. 760 (1905). German Ins. Co. v. Bart-
lett, 188 Ill. 165, 173, 58 N.E. 1075, 1077 (1900); Frazier v. Burks, 95 Ill. App. 2d
51, 56, 238 N.E.2d 78, 81 (1968); Haskell v. Siegmund, 28 I1. App. 2d 1, 9,
170 N.E.2d 393, 397 (1960).
At the close of the State's evidence, appellant's attorney offered into evi-
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death or unavailability criterion has been liberally construed in Illinois
and elsewhere. In Frazier v. Burks,8 for example, an appellate
court decided that a declarant in abscontia who could not be sub-
poenaed was sufficiently unavailable to satisfy the spirit of the excep-
tion.
Insanity, grave illnesses, being without the jurisdiction, and privi-
lege are more and more commonly regarded as fulfilling the unavail-
ability requirement of this common law exception.9 But, in stating
that a witness, present in court and otherwise competent, is unavail-
able "due merely to a lapse of time" or "because he no longer recalls
the facts," the court has gone beyond the gradual broadening which
this and other jurisdictions have witnessed 0 and begun, instead, to
ogle Rule 63(10) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence" or the new
dence on behalf of appellant, the following letter. . . . Upon objection by
the State the trial judge asked defense counsel if Hall was available and
the defense attorney replied, "Not to my knowledge." The trial judge
then sustained the objection.
It is the rule in every jurisdiction that before evidence of this kind should
be admitted, it must first be shown that the declarant is unavailable to
testify by reason of death, illness, insanity, or that he is out of the state.
. . . Since no attempt was made to show that Hall was unavailable to
testify for any of the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly sustained
the objection to the Hall letter.
People v. Archibald, 129 Ill. App. 2d 400, 402-03, 263 N.E.2d 711, 712-13 (1970)
(per curiam).
8. 95 Ill. App. 2d 51, 238 N.E.2d 78 (1968).
9. See R. HUNTER, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ILLINOIS LAWYERS § 66:27 (4th ed.
1972); 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence § 617 (1967).
10. In People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825
(1970), the court said:
The rule in New York should be modernized to hold that an admission
against penal interest will be received where material and where the
person making the admission is dead, beyond the jurisdiction and thus
not available; or where he is in court and refuses to testify as to the fact
of the admission on the ground of self incrimination.
11. Under Rule 62(7) of the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (1953), "Unavail-
able as a witness" includes situations where the witness is (a) exempted on the
ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his statement
is relevant, (b) disqualified from testifying to the matter, (c) unable to be present
or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental
illness, (d) absent beyond the jurisdiction of the court to compel appearance by its
process or (e) absent from the place of hearing because the proponent of his state-
ment does not know and with diligence has been unable to ascertain his where-
abouts.
A witness is not unavailable (a) if the judge finds that his exemption, disqualifi-
cation, inability or absence is due to procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent
of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testify-
ing, or to the culpable neglect of such party or (b) if unavailability is claimed
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Rule 803 of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence which dispense
with the requirement of real unavailability altogether. 2
If Illinois courts are to adopt the "spirit" of proposed Federal
Rules 803 and 804"s just as the Illinois Supreme Court in the Mont-
gomery opinion quite abruptly adopted the letter of proposed Fed-
eral Rule 609 on impeachment as future Illinois law,14 perhaps we
under clause (d) of the preceding paragraph, the judge finding that the deposition
of the declarant could have been taken by the exercise of reasonable diligence and
without undue hardship, and that the probable importance of the testimony is such
as to justify the expense of taking such deposition.
12. See Rule 804 comments, 51 F.R.D. at 439-45.
13. Rule 804 contains a definition of unavailability applicable to the exceptions
for former testimony, statements of recent perception, dying declarations, state-
ments against interest and statements of pedigree. It provides as follows:
(a) Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" in-
cludes situations in which the declarant:
(1) Is exempted by ruling of the judge on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his
statement despite an order of the judge to do so; or
(3) Testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his state-
ment; or
(4) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of this statement has
been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable
means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal,
claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement
or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
Id. at 438.
14. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Ray, 54 Ill. 2d 377, 380-82, 297
N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (1973) recently recalled their processes which led to the change:
In its argument in Montgomery, the People, relying on our 1947 decision
in People v. Buford, 396 111. 158, 71 N.E.2d 340, took the position that
the concerned statute (I11. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 155-1) "requires
the trial judge to admit evidence of a prior conviction to impeach the
credibility of a defendant whenever the prosecution sees fit to offer it ...
The question is inherently judicial. .. ."
We then continued with a discussion of factors to be considered by a
trial court in deciding whether to allow impeachment by a prior convic-
tion. We cited Rule 609 of the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (since adopted
with changes by the Supreme Court of the United States, Federal Rules
of Evidence [citation omitted]), which sets out a number of criteria for
deciding whether prior convictions may be used to attack a witness' credi-
bility. We concluded our opinion in Montgomery by declaring that "* * *
the provisions of this Rule [609] should be followed in future cases. .. "
It is clear from a reading of Montgomery that this holding was based
on the interpretation we there gave the statute.
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should get all of the form, including proposed Rule 804(b)(4)
which allows into evidence declarations against interest which would
tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability-the penal interest
exception. The law in Illinois with respect to declarations admitting
criminal liability is, at best, cloudy. 15 The majority opinion in Nay-
lor ducked incorporating new hearsay penal interest law into their
holding that the state of the record was such that they could not
ascertain whether the prior testimony of Spagnola amounted to a
declaration against pecuniary interest. 16  The court found as
grounds for this holding that declarant would suffer tort liability
for intentional assault, a contention that would have stretched the
knot of pecuniary interest, but saved the camel's view that Illinois
just does not recognize statements against a penal interest alone.' 7
15. See cases cited in People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952),
which stated the general rule of exclusion of declarations against penal interest in
Illinois but allowed, "in the interest of Justice" a confession of murder by a third
party offered as exculpatory evidence by a defendant in a criminal trial; Hunter's
Handbook speaks of "older cases" not admitting penal declarations and the present
tendency to admit a declaration against penal interest:
It is submitted that the distincion between pecuniary and penal interest
is highly unrealistic. In the first place, an admission that might tend to
subject the declarant to criminal punishment necessarily involves his
pecuniary interest, since it will probably subject him to a fine, loss of
earnings through incarceration, and the legal and other expenses involved
in defending himself. Furthermore, there is normally greater, rather than
less assurance of the reliability of the declaration against penal interest
because of the graver consequences that can flow from the admission.
R. HUNTER, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR ILLINOIS LAWYERS § 66:27, 630 (4th ed. 1972).
See excellent commentary in Note, Declarations Against Interest-Rules of Ad-
missibility, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 934 (1968); Note, Evidence-Declaration Against
Penal Interest Exception to Hearsay Rule, 12 DEPAuL L. REV. 323 (1963).
16. In the instant case, no disserving statement was admitted into evidence.
There may have been a declaration against interest made by Spagnola at
his prior criminal trial [admission of an assault] which would have allowed
the relevant portion of that testimony read into evidence in the instant
case to be properly received as a statement collateral to a declaration
against interest. However, from the present state of the record it can-
not be determined if the statements admitted into evidence were in fact
collateral to a declaration against interest.
9 111. App. 3d at 308, 292 N.E.2d at 231.
17. People v. Lettrich, 413 I11. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952); People v. Mosca-
tello, 114 Ill. App. 2d 16, 251 N.E.2d 532 (1969). For examples of declarations
against penal interest, see Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1944). The raison d'etre to both the
penal and pecuniary interest exceptions centers on the importance of the interests
of the declarant. It is a nice point in an age of spirit rights and liberties whether
a declaration which if true could subject one to possible criminal penalty or loss of
freedom is more or less, interest-wise, of importance to a declarant than mere
prospect of property or money loss.
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This is a perspective the concurring judge apparently shared, adding
that since plaintiff failed to satisfy the interest exception it was,
therefore, unnecessary and inadvisable to determine whether the re-
quirements of unavailability were satisfied.' 8
Parenthetically, the status and evidentiary admissibility of witness
Spagnola's prior testimony made a difference. Plaintiffs had to
prove a sale of liquor and had only witnesses' statements to show
that any of the four assailants in the case had actually purchased
liquor from defendant, a matter collateral to the drunkenness or as-
sault testimony to be sure, but admissible under the murky doctrine
that where and if a declaration against interest is admissible, other
statements occurring at the same time, though collateral to property,
pecuniary or penal declarations, as such, are pari passu also admissi-
ble."9
The point is that if the court selects the unavailability doctrine,
newly to be found in proposed Federal Rule 804 dealing with decla-
rations against interest, is there any special reason to stop short
with half a pint, so to speak? If Naylor, for instance, were to be
decided under the proposed Federal Rules, the declaration that he
(witness Spagnola) was drunk-a declaration independent to
whether he also admitted a stretched pecuniary or penal assault-
could conceivably be admissible under proposed Rule 804(b)(4)
as a declaration against social interest,20 defined as a statement
which would "make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace,
18. 9 I11. App. 3d at 309, 292 N.E.2d at 232 (1972) (Stamos, J., concurring).
19. A North Carolina court stated in Smith v. Moore "that the portion which
is trustworthy, because against interest, imparts credit to the whole declaration,"
142 N.C. 231, 238, 55 S.E. 275, 278 (1906). This area shares the fascination and
problems of "connection proximity" and relevance with the verbal act doctrine
where related and contemporary verbs occurring at the time of an equivocal act
are admissible as part of the relevant verbal act. The MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
provdes in Rule 509(2) that collateral statements are admissible if the judge finds
them to be closely connected with and thereby equally as trustworthy as the declara-
tion against interest.
If the so-called collateral statement has no bearing, other than contemporaneous-
ness, it would presumably not be admissible as would be the case, for instance,
where a witness declares implication in an illegal abortion and adds a declaration
concerning property, contract or another subject having no special relevance or
relation to the penal declaration.
20. 51 F.R.D. at 438, 444. For comparable provisions see CAL. EvIn. CODE
§ 1230 (West 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(j) (1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:
84A Rule 63(10) (Supp. 1973); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 63(10) (1953).
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that a reasonable man in his position would not have made . . .
unless he believed it to be true."'"
In all events, if Illinois would reform its law of admissibility of
declarations against interest, it is suggested that interest sufficient
to satisfy the implied assumption of hearsay exception reliability,
that is, the premise that people do not make statements damaging to
themselves unless true,22 should not be severed from the always rela-
tive principle of necessity underlying the unavailability rquirements.
Perhaps, for instance, declarations against social interests ought
to be admissible in Illinois only if the declarant is truly unavailable,
declarations against penal interest if partially unavailable and pro-
prietary interest whenever declarant just can not remember. Reform
of the concepts of interest2" and unavailability is needed in Illinois.
It is hoped that one will not, however, proceed to set the pace with-
out the other.24
21. 51 F.R.D. at 439. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 253, 255 (Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
A good guide to the range of possible social interests reached beyond defamation of
character might be those kinds of declarations involving specific acts of misconduct
admissible in some jurisdictions to impeach, i.e., bankruptcy or non-support. In
Illinois, drunkenness holds special sway in evidence law with lay opinions
admissible even where drunkenness is the ultimate issue.
22. I am reminded of a work called "How to be Your Own Best Friend," based
on the assumption that people do say untrue damaging statements against themselves.
23. The importance of the interest sufficient to insure relative sincerity is based,
of course, on the Folkquist and values of the age. Today, anti-discrimination and
civil rights compete in some manner with property or pecuniary interests, which
admittedly were the dominant motif of the mercantile era which nurtured the
exception in the first place.
24. Under the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, the unavailability require-
ment applies to former testimony, statements under belief of impending death,
statements against interest, statements of recent perception, statements of personal
or family history and former testimony. Rule 804(b), 51 F.R.D. at 438-39.
